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Abstract
The (re-)introduction of rent regulation in the form of rent controls, tenant protection or supply
rationing is back on the agenda of policymakers in light of rent inflation in many global cities.
While rent control as social policy promises short-term relief, economists point to their negative
long-run effects on new construction. This paper present long-run data on both rent regulation
and housing construction for 16 developed countries (1910–2017) and 44 developing countries
since the 1980s to confirm the economists’ view generally, albeit with certain reservations. The
negative effect of regulation can be offset by exemptions for new construction, by compen-
sating government construction and by a flight of new construction into the owner-occupied
sector. The overall magnitude of the effect is therefore not as high as expected and shows
non-linearities. But, although rent control is usually introduced with good social-policy inten-
tions, it generally risks to crowd out its object of regulation through inhibiting new construction.
Keywords: Residential construction, rent control, tenure security, housing rationing, panel
data model.
JEL codes: C23, O18, R38.
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1. Introduction
Long thought to be a relic of the past, rent control and other measures in protection of
urban tenants are back on the political agenda in a wide range of countries in Europe and
beyond. Even if the move towards homeownership has made owner-occupying household the
majority in almost all European countries and even more so worldwide, many European cities
remain dominated by tenant majorities. They still make up an important constituency whcih
protests for rent regulation as a form of social policy. Scholars of housing and social policy, by
contrast, still focus predominantly on social housing or homeownership as dominant segments
in the housing market. But recent years have experienced a surge in rental market regulation
intensity. Especially, in 2019, several countries and states have introduced new or invigorated
measures to keep the halt on rent increases. For example, in February 2019, the authorities
of the state Oregon imposed upper bounds on the rent increases of CPI growth rate plus
7%.1 Similarly, in Catalonia (Spain) in May 2019, a decree-law was issued capping initial rents
for dwellings whose surface does not exceed 150 m2 located in areas having a tense housing
market at the reference rent for similar dwellings in the neighborhood + 10%. Simultaneously
rent increases were pegged to the index of competitiveness recovery of Spain with respect to
the European Monetary Union.2 In June 2019, the red-red-green Senate of Berlin (Germany)
decided to design a law, according to which a Mietendeckel (literally meaning “rental lid”) would
be introduced leading to a rent freeze for the next five years, providing even for a possibility to
cut rent in case it is found to be too high.3
This renaissance of rent control even in the rigid forms of freezing rents introduced as first
generation of controls during the World Wars is surprising given the almost unanimous agree-
ment of economists about the negative effects of rent controls in general and tenancy regulation
1Senate Bill 608 relating to residential tenancies; creating new provisions; amending ORS 90.100, 90.220,
90.323, 90.427, 90.600, 90.643, 90.675 and 105.124; and declaring an emergency.
2Decreto ley 9/2019, de 21 de mayo, de medidas urgentes en materia de contencio´n de rentas en los con-
tratos de arrendamiento de vivienda y de modificacio´n del libro quinto del Co´digo civil de Catalun˜a en el
a´mbito de la prenda. This regulation was apparently influenced to a large extent by the so-called rental brake
(Mietpreisbremse) introduced in Germany in 2015.
3See official explanations of the planned regulations: https://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/wohnen/
wohnraum/mietendeckel/index.shtml. Inspired by Berlin’s initiative the leftist government of another Ger-
man Bundesland Bremen expressed its intention to closely follow the capital city’s experience in order to
eventually implement similar measures.
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in particular on the allocation of housing. Among the negative effects attributed to these market
regulations the allegedly negative effect on new construction is probably the most prominent.
Arnott (1995, p.99) noted the "widespread agreement that rent control discourages new pro-
duction." The restrictive housing market governmental regulations aiming to protect tenants
from unreasonable rent increases and evictions are thus blamed for depressing construction
activities and aggravating housing shortages. It is thought to reduce incentives for investing in
new residential construction, especially of rental housing, since governmental restrictions limit
rental revenues and the freedom of disposing of the real estate properties. Today’s climate of
urban housing shortages in many booming European cities lead many economists to regard the
removal of rent regulations as stimulus for new housing supply.
This study critically investigates the relationship between restrictive governmental housing
regulations — such as rent control, protection from eviction, and housing rationing — and
the residential construction. It draws on two novel databases ranging from 1910-2017 for 16
developed countries and from 1980-2017 for 44 developing countries: one contains regulation
indices based on manual coding of all major tenancy-related laws in a country, and one on
building activity. The regulation data includes data on regulation intensities for the three types
of restrictive housing policies with regard to rent control, security of tenancy and rationing of
housing units. The indices measure the intensity of regulations and vary between 0 and 1, the
higher values meaning a more active intervention of the government in the market activities and
less freedom for the market participants, especially the landlords. The second database contains
the annual time series of new residential construction (housing units). In addition, a wide range
of control variables are used, which reflect both economic (real GDP per capita, long-term
interest rates, mortgage debt) and demographic (population growth, total dependency ratio,
marriage rates) factors that are likely to affect building activity.
Our results tend to confirm the economists’ view: in normal and post-war periods, in
developing and developed countries, rent controls, tenancy-security and rationing regulation
have negative effects on new construction activity, but the significance is not as clear-cut as
economists would expect. Whereas rationing measures are significant throughout, security of
tenancy regulation is mostly insignificant and price regulation is significant for the developed
world in normal times only. Increasing the regulation by 1 on a scale from 0 to 1, decreases
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new construction by 0.06 per 1000 inhabitants. But this evidence also nuances the received
view: the negative effect is not as universal as generally expected. It is restricted to a subset
of countries and years. Moreover, we find evidence for a non-linearity: the negative effect
on construction only becomes active beyond a certain threshold. It is mostly significant for
the rigid first-generation absolute rent controls or rent freezing, but not necessarily for the
second-generation controls of relative price increases. We suggest that the rather surprising
non-universality of the rent-control effect could be explained by the fact that new construction
has mostly been excepted from rent control. Moreover, rent controls crowd out rental units
in favor of owner-occupied ones which can enjoy ongoing construction despite rent control.
Finally, rent control rarely comes without active government housing policies in favor of new
construction which can compensate for the loss of private construction. Beyond rent control,
the finding highlights that historical circumstances matter for expected effects to realize. In
that, rent control appears to be similar to minimum wage, a price freeze used on labor markets.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the effects of govern-
mental regulations on the residential construction. In section 3 our data are described. Section
4 explains the methodology applied in this study, while section 5 discusses the obtained results.
Finally, section 6 draws conclusions.
2. Determinants of residential construction
In this section, we briefly review works that investigated the effect of rent regulation on new
construction. Moreover we present a list of studies explaining new construction outcomes to
assemble necessary control variables for our own estimations below.
Rent regulation is a widely investigated phenomenon (Arnott, 1995), even though cross-
national quantitative studies of their effect on new residential construction is less well-covered.
The evidence of existing studies which all investigate the recent surge of rent legislation on
the two coasts of the United States or in Europe is rather mixed. The best evidence comes
from sub-national case studies. The most prominent recent quasi-experimental study of San-
Francisco estimated the effect on rent controls on new construction to amount to a reduction
of 15 percent (Diamond et al., 2019). Also studying San Francisco, Asquith (2019) finds a
reduction rental housing supply, as landlords sell off apartments in the condo-market or hold
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back supply. A similar phenomenon – a conversion of rental into owner-occupied units – has
been found by Fetter 2016 for the US rent controls during World War II.
However, Sims (2007), using microdata from a housing survey conducted in Massachusetts
in 1985–1998, finds little effect of rent control on new housing construction. Studying the
same de-control moment, Autor et al. (2014) also find a very low effect of de-control on new
residential investment. Mense et al. (2018) , who investigate a recent strengthening of German
rental policy — the rental brake (Mietpreisbremse) — establish that it fostered new construction
in the controlled municipalities.
Besides studies of rent control, there has been an interest to predict housing supply and
the building cycle, given its importance for the overall business cycle and employment in coun-
tries. The literature is, however, rather under-developed and inconclusive (DiPasquale, 1999;
Vermeulen and Rouwendal, 2007). Generally, studies explaining new construction (in single
or multi-family buildings) or new residential investment (or repair investment) in cities or
metropolitan areas find a positive house-price-elasticity that can range between 0 and 6, de-
pending on the country and on the short- or long-run (Malpezzi and Maclennan, 2001). But
prices alone do not suffice to explain variation in construction. Usually, additional factors such
as demography (population size, growth and structure), inflation and the time it needs to sell
are also found to play a role. In a study of four historical German cities during the pre-WWI
urbanization wave, for instance, the number of marriages was found to be nearly the single
most-important predictor of new supply (Wellenreuther, 1989b). Surprisingly, construction
costs are often found to be insignificant or indeterminate in direction (Caldera and Johansson,
2013). Supply of sufficient land for construction has been found to impact on the supply elastic-
ity in construction (Glaeser et al., 2008a). Mortgage market conditions themselves are hardly
mentioned in this literature which is probably due to the fact that many studies use regional
US data and urban or regional mortgage data are difficult to come by. In the few cases where
interest rates, credit constraints or savings deposits are mentioned (DiPasquale and Wheaton,
1994a; Poterba, 1984), they point in the expected direction: more permissive mortgage condi-
tions and capital injections are a demand stimulus for housing supply. We summarize the more
detailed findings of these studies in Table 1 and note that demographic and economic controls
such as such as interest rates, building costs, economic growth, marriage rates and population
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rates, housing price stimulation, etc. are among the frequently used control variables.
3. Data
In this section, we present the variables and operationalization used in this study. For the
sake of convenience, we split them into dependent variable, control variables, and regulation
indices. Table 3 reports the sources of data in more detail and presents the descriptive statistics.
3.1. Housing construction intensity
Our dependent variable is the housing construction intensity, which is defined as the number
of completed dwellings per 1000 persons. Surveying construction requires a certain governmen-
tal control of property rights and the construction sector which is not given in many developing
nations and therefore restricts the countries we can sensibly include in the study. Construction
volume is available as permits, starts and completions, unfortunately with different country
coverage. The advantage of housing starts (and permits) as measure is that they are the most
sensitive measures to reveal macroeconomic impacts on initiated construction activity. Their
obvious shortcoming is that not all housing starts end up in completions and capital forma-
tion due to construction-loan problems, bad calculations, or speculation. Completions, in turn,
have the disadvantage that they lag behind starts with one or two years. On the positive side,
however, they indicate what really has been constructed and their coverage across countries is
highest. For these reasons, we opt for completions as the measure for new construction volume.
To control for demography right from the start, we divide completions by the current popula-
tion, which yields a commonly used variable in the range of 2 to 15 completed units per 1000
inhabitants. In cases of missing completion data due to countries’ not having surveyed them
at all (Belgium) or only at certain points in time (USA), we approximate completions through
housing starts and permits. Our rule of approximation is the following: If available, we use the
first lag of housing starts multiplied by the median ratio of housing completions and starts in
our sample excluding the war and post-war years, namely 0.98. If starts are also not available,
we use the first lag of permits again multiplied by the average ratio of housing completions and
permits, namely 0.95. This is to make sure that the levels of completions is approximated, as
the over-time trends is highly similar. For the available data, both lagged permits and lagged
housing starts strongly correlate (r = 0.98).
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3.2. Control variables
Based on the literature review we identified the list of variables to be controlled for, mainly
the common demographic and economic background variables. Additions to the housing stock
are a reaction to demographic needs. We therefore control for population growth to account for
rising demand. As a more refined measure, we also control for marriage rates per population
because they indicate the formation of new households. Family formation requires the extension
of living space, whereas older household cut back leaving space at higher age. We therefore
also include dependency ratio by interpolating the age composition of the population surveyed
at census points.4
On the economic side, we control for GDP per capita as higher income levels allow for more
construction to take place. The business cycle is also known for its strong correlation with the
building cycle (Leamer, 2007). Most new construction is not financed out of equity, which is
why capital markets play a crucial role. We, therefore, include long-term interest rates that
govern mortgage lending. Moreover, we include the growth of mortgage lending: in normal
times, more mortgage supply should lead to new construction, but we also include its quadratic
term, as too high levels of mortgage indebtedness has been found to just drive up prices and to
not extend supply further. New construction depends on the relative attractiveness to build,
we, therefore, include the relative rate of return computed as a difference between housing
rental returns and stock market returns in the estimation.
3.3. Regulation indices
This study focuses on the effects of governmental regulations. Therefore, we need measures
of intensity of such regulations. For this purpose, we use the restrictive rental market regu-
lations indices elaborated by Kholodilin (2018) and Weber (2017). They cover three types of
regulations: rent control, tenure security, and housing rationing. Rent control index measures
the intensity restrictions imposed on the level of rent and its rate of increase. Economists distin-
guish between the first and second-generation rent control (Arnott, 1995). The first generation
implies a rent freeze, when rents are fixed at some level, while under the second-generation rent
4Marriage rates and age composition are interpolated using an R-package stinepack based on Stineman
(1980).
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control, starting rent is generally set at the market level, but its growth rate is anchored to
some measure of living cost. Here, we use two regulation indices, RC_1 and RC_2, for the
first- and second-generation rent control, respectively. The tenure security index reflects the
degree of protection of tenants from evictions by landlords. The main instruments of protection
are 1) eviction protection during term or period; 2) eviction protection at the end of term or
period; 3) imposition of minimum duration of rental contracts; and 4) prohibition of short-term
(less than one year) tenancies. The housing rationing index measures the intensity of redistri-
bution of the existing housing stock. All three indices can vary between 0 and 1: the higher
the index the more intense the regulation. The indices are constructed based on a thorough
analysis of the corresponding legal acts. Table 2 lists the countries for which regulation indices
are constructed.
4. Econometric methodology
In this section, we describe the methodology used to estimate the impact of restrictive
housing regulations upon construction intensity. The availability of longitudinal data suggests
the use of a panel data model. Given the strong persistence of construction intensity and in
order to remove serial correlation and potential non-stationarity, we compute the dependent
variable as the first difference of the log of construction intensity.
yit = β
′xit + γ′zi,t−2 + ηi + θt + vit (1)
where yit is the first difference of the construction intensity in country i in the year t; xit is the
vector of control variables; zit is the vector of regulation indices; ηi is the country fixed effects;
θt is the time fixed effects; vit is the random disturbance; and β is the vector of coefficients.
We transform the explanatory variables that are non-stationary (population, mortgages,
GDP per capita) into growth rates or first differences which also transforms these stock-variables
into flows, better apt to explain the flow of new constructions. We use the second lag of the
regulation indices in order to capture the fact that housing construction takes time. Thus,
changes in regulations affect first the willingness of investors to apply for permits. Only after
the permits are obtained the construction can begin. For the control variables we use their first
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lags. Given that we work with annual data, one lag should be sufficient.
5. Results
We first describe how construction and tenancy regulation developed across time and regions
to then present the multivariate results.
5.1. Descriptive findings
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the three regulation indices between 1910 and 2017. All
curves show a two-hump structure: regulation set in with World War I (WWI) as consumer
socialism for the home front of soldiers’ families, was then reversed during the interwar years
only to spike again during World War II (WWII). But whereas rationing was almost completely
reversed afterwards, tenancy security was largely maintained throughout all jurisdictions on
average. Rent regulation itself lost in intensity everywhere: the strong first-generation freezes
of absolute rent levels softened into second-generation regulation of rent increases. While this
is a broad common stories across jurisdictions, there are notable country-group differences:
socialist countries are obviously among the most regulated even after wars, countries of English
law tradition least so. The remaining mostly European countries show a more loosely regulated
German-law tradition in contrast to more regulated Scandinavian and French law tradition.
Figure 2 adds the long-run construction cycle to the picture. Socialist countries excepted,
there is a rough countercyclical movement of construction and rent regulation over the 20th
century: rent regulation surges in war times when construction is low and is fades out with the
building cycle taking off. Towards the end of the reporting period, the negative correlation is
less evident as building cycles can occur even at a constant rent level.
5.2. Multivariate estimations
In what follows, we estimate five different models, depending on the combination of rental
regulation indices and control variables included. We estimate these five models four times
in four different tables, making use of the different subsamples. We first start with the global
estimate of all countries and all years and, secondly, take all countries but excluding the war and
post-war periods before 1960. Figure 3 shows 60 countries for which the regressions in Tables 4
and 5 are estimated. The unbalanced number of observations varies from 30 for Slovakia to 87
8
for 19 developed countries. For these global samples, we need to do with less control variables
for reasons of availability.
The third and fourth samples narrows in on just the developed countries again for the whole
time period and for the war-unaffected post-1960 period only. In Figure 4, the data availability
for the 16 developed countries is shown. For these countries a much wider set of control variables
is available, which are used to estimate regressions reported in Tables 6 and 7.
Tables 4 and 5 report estimation results for a wide panel of countries for the whole sample
and war-unaffected subsample, respectively, because war- and post-war-times are arguably very
unrepresentative times for housing policies and rent policies in particular. Rental regulation
effects are somewhat stronger for the war-unaffected period. Three regulation indices are sta-
tistically significant: housing rationing and, for the war-unaffected subsample, the general rent
regulation which is almost completely due to the remaining hard first-generation price con-
trols. All affect the intensity of residential construction negatively. Thus, stricter regulations,
limiting the freedom of landlords to set prices and to evict tenants, diminish the incentives to
build new housing. During the whole sample, out of the economic control variables, growth
of real per-capita GDP is statistically significant. It exerts a strong positive effect on the
construction intensity, which corroborates economic theory and common sense. Indeed, rising
incomes increase demand for housing and, thus, stimulate construction. For the war-unaffected
subsample, marriage rates have a positive statistically significant effect.
Table 6 zooms in on the developed countries only. For the complete time period, all regula-
tion indices display a negative coefficient, but with low significance levels. Here it is the marriage
rates and capital markets (interest rates and mortgages) which are significantly associated with
new production of housing. While lower interest rates and more mortgages generally lead to
increases of new construction, an overextension of mortgages even depresses new construction
(negative quadratic term). The addition of demographic and particularly economic variables
normally associated with the building cycle takes away the significance of regulation indices.
Much of this is however driven by the war-time effects as the war-unaffected subsample
results in Table 7 shows: post-1960, all rent regulation indices, including regulation of tenancy
security, are negatively associated with construction and significantly so. The one exception
is rent price regulation when its quadratic term is added. The effects of rent control on the
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intensity of residential construction are shown for four different subsamples (all vs. developed,
whole period vs. post-1960 period) in Figure 5. The linear effects are the smallest for the
models estimated over the whole period: the largest decline of the growth rate of construction
intensity is obtained for the maximum rent control intensity (equal to 1) and is between -1.3%
for all and -1.6% for developed economies. For the post-1960 period, the effects are much larger,
varying from the largest decline of about -6% for all countries to almost -8% for developed ones.
Assume that in the initial situation (period t) there is no rent control and that construction
intensity is 10 dwellings per 1000 inhabitants. If next year (t + 1) the strictest rent control
policy is introduced, in t+3 the construction intensity would fall to 9.84-9.87 dwellings per 1000
persons for the whole period and to 9.2-9.4 dwellings per 1000 persons for the post-1960 period.
In a country with 100 million inhabitants, it would correspond to a reduction of residential
construction by 13,000-16,000 and 60,000-80,000 dwellings, respectively. Non-linear effects are
evident in three cases out of four; only in the model estimated for the whole sample, there is no
visible difference between the linear and quadratic effects. In the models estimated for the whole
period, the largest decline in the construction intensity is observed at the rent control intensity
of 0.6; the consequent invigoration of rent control leads to diminishing negative effects. The
non-linear effects can in part be explained by an extensive government support of construction,
which often accompanies very strict rent control. The government observes that strong rent
controls lead to a dramatic fall in construction intensity and is forced to undertake measures
in order to encourage building activities. Since we do not have reliable variables capturing
such policies, this effect is captured by the non-linear models estimated for the whole period.
Taking our previous example, the introduction of rent control with intensity 0.6 in t+1, would
lead in period t+3 to a decline of construction intensity to about 9.72-9.74 dwellings per 1000
inhabitants, corresponding to a fall of total construction by 26,000-28,000 units. In the case
of developed countries after 1959, the increase of rent control intensity from 0 to 0.3 does not
really affect the residential construction intensity. It is only beyond this level that negative the
impact is put in force. Overall, the magnitude of rent control effects in these models is sizable,
but perhaps below the negative impact usually expected.
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6. Discussion and conclusion
The overall finding points to a negative impact of rent regulation on new residential construc-
tion: throughout different samples and specifications, the regulation coefficients are negative,
albeit with changing levels of significance. The finding is most persistent for rationing and
first-generation rent-control and most pronounced for the war-unaffected period which reaches
up to the current day. But for developed countries, even higher levels of security of tenure can
depress new construction.
This overall finding, however, needs to be nuanced. Given the near unanimous position
of economists on the effect under study, our study contains some surprising elements: first,
both models covering the whole time period do not find any significant rent-control effect other
than for the war-related first-generation controls and rationing. One explanation could be
that lower rent law levels correspond to the more flexible first-generation rent control, while
higher ones correspond to the much more restrictive first-generation rent control. This is in
line with the previous research (Mense et al., 2018) . Second, there is (weak) evidence for a
non-linearity of the rent-control effect: beyond a certain threshold, rent control loses its bite
on new construction, probably because no further crowding-out takes place and perhaps even
a crowding-in through state construction. Finally, one could argue that the magnitude of the
examined effects is not particularly high in general.
What could explain the deviance from the usually expected result? One obvious explanation
is that rent control laws often exempt new construction from regulations. The purpose of such
exceptions is to guarantee that the incentives for building new houses are not diminished. Thus,
the rents for newly built dwellings are not controlled and so the investors can earn decent profits
on it. But investors might still shy away from further investment in rental stock, as they might
expect a general deterioration of investment climate and a slippery slope towards even more
state intervention.
A second explanation can draw on the fact that rent regulation crowds out rental dwellings
in favor of owner-occupied ones (Fetter, 2016). A potential reduction of completions of rental
dwellings can thus be more than offset by the increase in the completion numbers of the owner-
occupied housing. This is all the more probable, given the finding of some researchers that the
homeowner dominated societies are more prone to the speculative house price dynamics. The
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homeowners or would be owners seeing the house price increases and expecting them to go on
further are eager to participate in the overall speculative movement hoping to obtain capital
gains. Thus, more housing is built in such economies than in the tenant dominated ones, where
most people are rather unwilling to see the house prices increase, since this often goes hand in
hand with the rent increases. It should be noted also that the switch from a tenant dominance
to a homeowner dominance can be a result of too strict rental regulations. In principle, one
would need to replace our current dependent variable of all new constructions by the new rental
constructions, but the future use of a housing unit is not necessarily known, let alone surveyed,
at the point of its construction.
A final explanation for why rent regulation is not universally damaging new construction
resides in the fact that in many historical cases the restrictive rental measures are accompa-
nied by housing policies seeking to foster the building activities through social housing or the
stimulation of more private housing construction. This has especially been the case after major
housing supply shocks caused by wars or natural catastrophes. The inevitable rent increases are
fought against using rent control and the resulting unwillingness to build by private investors
makes the government step in and to either replace the private building initiative or stimulate it
artificially. This could also explain why the global sample results showed less significant results
as they included the period of strongest state intervention in housing markets.
Rent control measures of even the hard first-generation rent freezes are currently debated
and passed in European countries and beyond. Often introduced with good intentions as social
policy in favor of tenants, our results suggest that economists have a point when warning about
its unintended consequences of depressing new construction. Rent controls help sitting tenants
in the short-run but contribute to future housing shortages for new tenants in the longer-run.
This long-run result can partially be offset by additional state policies stimulating housing
construction, but under rent control, the efforts to spur residential construction have to be
much larger than in its absence. This undermines the frequently used argument that rent
control is an interim measure employed in order to combat the rent increasing, while awaiting
for the construction to gain momentum. Therefore, if one wants to overcome the housing
shortage as soon as possible, it is better to abstain from restricting rents, especially from using
the first-generation rent control.
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Africa Algeria, Angola, Benin, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Niger,
Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Tunisia
11 60
Asia Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Hong Kong, India (Delhi,
Maharashtra, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal), Israel,
Macao, Myanmar, Pakistan (Punjab), Philippines, Singa-
pore, Turkey
16 51
Europe Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, GDR, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Slovakia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Ukraine
35 53
LAC Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Domini-
can Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico (Distrito Federal, Ve-





Canada (Alberta, Ontario, Quebec), USA 4 5 (60)
Oceania Australia, French Polynesia, New Zealand 3 29
World 86 250
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Table 3: Description of variables used in the analysis
Variable Description Source Period Minimum Mean Maximum Standard
deviation
New_const Housing completions by 1000
inhabitants
Kohl (2020) 1899-2016 0.020 5.656 30.587 3.459
Rent_laws Rent laws index, [0, 1] REMAIN 1910-2017 0 0.482 1 0.398
Rent_laws2 Square of rent laws index, [0, 1] REMAIN 1910-2018 0 0.391 1 0.390
RC_1 First-generation rent control
index, [0, 1]
REMAIN 1910-2018 0 0.493 1 0.500
RC_2 Second-generation rent control
index, [0, 1]
REMAIN 1910-2018 0 0.059 1 0.236
Tenure_security Tenure security index, [0, 1] REMAIN 1910-2018 0 0.344 1 0.244
Rationing Housing rationing index, [0, 1] REMAIN 1910-2018 0 0.107 0.875 0.179
RMRI Rental market regulation in-
dex, [0, 1]
REMAIN 1910-2018 0 0.413 0.917 0.293
GDP Gross domestic product, local
currency
Macrohistory 1899-2016
GDP_PC Real GDP per capita, 1990 in-
ternational Geary-Khamis dol-
lars
Maddison 1899-2016 0.431 10.371 81.923 11.542
DLGDP_PC Real per-capita GDP growth
rate
own calculations 1900-2016 -0.873 0.021 1.006 0.069
LTIR Long-term interest rate, % Macrohistory and
OECD
1899-2016 -0.251 6.355 209.6 6.022
Loan2GDP Total loans-to-GDP ratio, %
(TLoan/GDP)
own calculations 1899-2016 0.019 0.616 2.045 0.370
DLPop Population growth Maddison and own cal-
culations
1900-2016 -0.343 0.013 0.261 0.013
Dep_ratio Ratio of dependent (younger
than 15 and older than 64 y.o.)
population to working-age (15
through 64 y.o.) population,
[0, 1]
World Development In-
dicators of the World
Bank and European
University Institute
1899-2016 0.243 0.634 1.118 0.173
Rel_return Housing return minus equity
return
Macrohistory 1899-2015 -0.096 0.012 0.102 0.025




1899-2016 -0.752 -0.023 0.201 0.059




1899-2017 0.668 7.011 27.400 2.556
Note: BIS = Bank for International Settlements (https://www.bis.org/statistics/pp_detailed.htm); Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (https://www.dallasfed.
org/institute/houseprice#tab2); Macrohistory = Jorda`-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database (http://www.macrohistory.net/data/); Maddison = Mad-
dison Historical Statistics (https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/); OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Housing prices data (https://data.oecd.org/price/housing-prices.htm); REMAIN = Rental Market Regulation Index database (https://www.remain-data.
org/).
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Table 4: Estimation results of panel data model: all countries, whole period
Dependent variable: growth rate of construction intensity









Tenure_security_lag2 −0.022 −0.013 −0.014
(0.063) (0.069) (0.057)
Rationing_lag2 −0.147∗∗ −0.146∗∗ −0.133∗∗ −0.156∗∗
(0.050) (0.047) (0.046) (0.057)
RMRI_lag2 −0.031
(0.037)
Dep_ratio_lag1 −0.064 −0.066 −0.057 −0.061
(0.108) (0.116) (0.117) (0.109)
DLGDP_PC_lag1 0.472∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.136)
DLpop_lag1 0.781 0.770 0.793 0.736
(1.163) (1.106) (1.132) (1.149)
Marriage_rate_interp 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
R2 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.028
Num. obs. 2225 2225 2225 2225
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 5: Estimation results of panel data model: all countries, 1960–2017
Dependent variable: growth rate of construction intensity









Tenure_security_lag2 −0.003 0.005 −0.003
(0.041) (0.045) (0.041)
Rationing_lag2 −0.142∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
RMRI_lag2 −0.080∗∗
(0.031)
Dep_ratio_lag1 0.037 0.051 0.065 0.037
(0.100) (0.105) (0.098) (0.104)
DLGDP_PC_lag1 0.416∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.122)
DLpop_lag1 1.040 1.091 1.021 1.041
(1.252) (1.248) (1.250) (1.265)
Marriage_rate_interp 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.040 0.039 0.042 0.040
Num. obs. 1870 1870 1870 1870
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 6: Estimation results of panel data model: developed countries, whole period
Dependent variable: growth rate of construction intensity









Tenure_security_lag2 −0.083∗ −0.102∗ −0.073
(0.041) (0.051) (0.039)
Rationing_lag2 −0.081 −0.082 −0.071 −0.087
(0.095) (0.096) (0.096) (0.099)
RMRI_lag2 −0.094
(0.063)
DLGDP_PC_lag1 0.252 0.256 0.260 0.256
(0.179) (0.179) (0.181) (0.177)
LTIR_lag1 −0.003∗ −0.003∗ −0.002 −0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Rel_return_lag1 −0.045 0.007 0.014 −0.004
(0.222) (0.225) (0.232) (0.227)
DLoan2GDP_lag1 0.177 0.189 0.185 0.195
(0.176) (0.179) (0.177) (0.180)
DLoan2GDP2_lag1 −5.032∗∗∗ −5.142∗∗∗ −5.068∗∗∗ −5.140∗∗∗
(1.079) (1.029) (1.056) (1.088)
GBal2GDP_lag1 0.015 −0.013 0.030 −0.001
(0.191) (0.179) (0.190) (0.197)
DLpop_lag1 1.874 1.593 1.816 1.792
(1.637) (1.634) (1.701) (1.667)
Dep_ratio_lag1 −0.275 −0.292 −0.314 −0.279
(0.196) (0.212) (0.203) (0.195)
Marriage_rate_interp_lag1 0.027∗ 0.028∗ 0.028∗ 0.027∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
R2 0.054 0.052 0.057 0.055
Num. obs. 1005 1005 1005 1005
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
21
Table 7: Estimation results of panel data model: developed countries, 1960–2017
Dependent variable: growth rate of construction intensity









Tenure_security_lag2 −0.069 −0.087 −0.072
(0.036) (0.046) (0.038)
Rationing_lag2 −0.221∗∗∗ −0.221∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.054) (0.061) (0.055)
RMRI_lag2 −0.157∗∗
(0.050)
DLGDP_PC_lag1 0.629∗∗ 0.627∗∗ 0.629∗∗ 0.628∗∗
(0.207) (0.202) (0.206) (0.207)
LTIR_lag1 −0.003∗ −0.003∗ −0.002 −0.003∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Rel_return_lag1 0.162 0.142 0.169 0.160
(0.324) (0.305) (0.341) (0.325)
DLoan2GDP_lag1 0.153 0.150 0.140 0.140
(0.196) (0.196) (0.198) (0.196)
DLoan2GDP2_lag1 −3.144∗ −3.113∗ −3.153∗ −3.090∗
(1.276) (1.298) (1.276) (1.286)
GBal2GDP_lag1 0.303 0.310 0.337 0.311
(0.201) (0.193) (0.212) (0.202)
DLpop_lag1 1.443 1.499 1.405 1.639
(0.774) (0.798) (0.897) (0.873)
Dep_ratio_lag1 −0.055 −0.054 −0.030 −0.070
(0.129) (0.127) (0.141) (0.141)
Marriage_rate_interp_lag1 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
R2 0.095 0.095 0.094 0.096
Num. obs. 807 807 807 807
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Figure 1: Rent regulations by legal origin













































































































































































































































Figure 2: Construction and intensity rent control by legal origin








































































































































































































































Figure 3: Availability of data for all countries
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Figure 4: Availability of data for developed countries
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Figure 5: Impact of rent control on residential construction intensity








































(a) All countries, whole period


































(b) All countries, from 1960


































(c) Developed countries, whole period
































(d) Developed countries, from 1960
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